

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 106242  
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 106242

FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S PARTY

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO BONN, CAPE TOWN,  
GABORONE, LAGOS, LONDON, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, OTTAWA, PARIS,  
PRETORIA, USUN NEWYORK FROM DAR ES SALAAM MAY 10:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 1891

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SF, US, XA

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP ON NAMIBIA TALKS

REF: STATE 103413

1. IN ACCORDBNCE WITH AGREEMENT REACHED IN MEETING BETWEEN  
FRENCH AND FRG AMBASSADORS, CANADIAN AND UK HICOMS AND  
CHARGE, MCLAREN (CANADA) BRIEFED PRESIDENT NYERERE THIS  
MORNING ON FIVE POWER TALKS ON NAMIBIA. MCLAREN WAS ACCOMPANIED  
BY AMB MCHENRY AND BY AMB THABAULT (FRANCE) WHO, IT WAS  
EXPLAINED WERE IN DAR TO MEET WITH SWAPO PRESIDENT NUJOMA. NYERERE  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 106242

RECEIVED THE GROUP AT STATE HOUSE. MKAPA, TANZANIAN FOREIGN  
MINISTER, AND SALIM, TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR TO UN ALSO PRESENT.  
MEETING LASTED ONE HOUR AND THERE WAS FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE  
THROUGHOUT.

2. AFTER HEARING AMB MCLAREN'S PRESENTATION ALONG THE LINES  
OF THE AGREED TALKING POINTS, PRESIDENT NYERERE ASKED IF PRIME

MINISTER VORSTER UNDERSTOOD THAT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN NAMIBIA MUST BE INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE. HE RECALLED THAT IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER HE HAD STRESSED THAT THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WAS ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL SINCE WHAT IT DID COULD DETERMINE NATURE OF A FUTURE INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT. NYERERE SAID THAT THE KISSINGER TALKS HAD ENVISAGED THAT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WOULD RESULT FROM A GENEVA-TYPE CONFERENCE. IN HIS VIEW THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY, OR WHATEVER ONE CALLED IT, MUST MEET THE TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY. "YOU DON'T", HE SAID, "MOVE FROM ONE UNACCEPTABLE AUTHORITY TO ANOTHER." IN GREAT DETAIL AND PRECISION TO THE POINT OF CITING SPECIFIC DATES, HE DESCRIBED KISSINGER'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE WHERE TURNHALLE WOULD INVITE SWAPO TO GENEVA TALKS. THIS PROCEDURE BEING UNACCEPTABLE, KISSINGER HAD PROPOSED UN PAID AND SPONSORED CONFERENCE BETWEEN SWAPO AND TURNHALLE WITH SOUTH AFRICAN PARTICIPATION ON SOME SUBJECTS. HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY A CONFERENCE NEVER MATERIALIZED.

3. AMB MCHENRY SAID HE HAD BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE KISSINGER PROPOSALS. SWAPO HAD OBJECTED TO TALKS BETWEEN SWAPO AND TURNHALLE AND CALLED FOR TALKS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAPO. SWAPO DID NOT OBJECT TO TURNHALLE PARTICIPATION AS PART OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION. MCHENRY AGREED WITH NYERERE THAT THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE PERIOD OF THE ELECTION PROCEDURE WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. IT WAS BECAUSE OF THIS BELIEF THAT THE FIVE WERE MOST RELUCTANT TO COMMENT ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF VORSTER'S "CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY." THE FIVE HAD SPECIFICALLY INFORMED VORSTER THAT TURNHALLE BY ANOTHER TIME WAS AN UNNECESSARY COMPLICATION OF AN ALREADY COMPLICATED TASK. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 106242

WHILE THE FIVE HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF A CONFERENCE, I.E., BEYOND GETTING THE PARTIES IN THE SAME CITY IN ORDER TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS, HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT IT ADVISABLE TO AVOID A CONFERENCE ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. SUCH CONFERENCES TENDED TO DELAY MATTERS AS EACH PARTY SOUGHT TO WIN IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT THOSE PROVISIONS AND POSITIONS THEY SOUGHT AT INDEPENDENCE. THE ALTERNATIVE WAS A DRASTIC ALTERATION OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT SUFFICIENT TO PURSUE FAIR ELECTIONS, FOLLOWED BY THE DRAFTING OF A CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE.

R. NYERERE AGREED THAT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT COULD COME ABOUT IN TWO WAYS: THROUGH A CONFERENCE IN WHICH SWAPO PARTICIPATED; OR ALTERNATIVELY, THROUGH CONTINUATION OF GOVERNMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA. IN THE LATTER CASE THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A "LARGE MEASURE" OF UN PARTICIPATION. SEVERAL TIMES NYERERE CAME BACK TO THE QUESTION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND HOW IT WAS TO BE ESTABLISHED AND WHAT FORMAL PROCEDURES WERE TO BE USED IN OBTAINING THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. IN HIS VIEW, SOME KIND OF CONFERENCE WAS NECESSARY. "THE THREE OF THEM

(SWAPO, THE UN AND SOUTH AFRICA) MUST GET TOGETHER AT SOME POINT." HE WAS, HE SAID, WILLING TO HELP SOUTH AFRICA SAVE FACE ONCE THEY WERE COMMITTED TO AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA. HE RECOGNIZED THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD ITS OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH WHICH IT MUST DEAL BUT HE (NYERERE) HAD THE POLITICAL REALITY OF SWAPO ALSO.

5. MCHENRY SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO LET TALKS BREAK DOWN OVER TERMINOLOGY. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THE SUBSTANCE. HE RECALLED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT PM VORSTER HAD BEEN ADAMANT AGAINST THE TERM UN SUPERVISION AND CONTROL -- AT WHICH POINT NYERERE INTERJECTED THAT VORSTER WAS EVEN MORE ADAMANT AGAINST SWAPO AND NUJOMA -- BUT SEEMED TO HAVE LESS OBJECTION TO THE SUBSTANCE. NYERERE AGAIN STATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO HELP SOUTH AFRICA SAVE FACE. HE DIDN'T CARE WHAT THE UN INVOLVEMENT WAS CALLED. THE UN MUST HAVE SOME "GRIP" ON NAMIBIA TO ASSURE THE FAIRNESS OF AN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 106242

ELECTORAL PROCESS.

6. MCHENRY SUGGESTED THAT DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WERE AHEAD AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE CAPE TOWN TALKS. THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE PROMPT PARTICIPATION AND AVAILABILITY OF ALL PARTIES. HE REGRETTED THAT SWAPO PRESIDENT NUJOMA WAS PROVING DIFFICULT TO LOCATE. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENTS OF THE FRONT LINE STATES WOULD BE ASSISTANCE WITH NUJOMA. WITH SPARKLING EYES AND GREAT HUMOR, NYERERE SUGGESTED THAT TRACKING DOWN SWAPO WAS A PART OF THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND ONE SHOULD NOT GIVE UP. HE TURNED TO HIS COLLEAGUES, NONE OF WHOM KNEW THE WHEREABOUTS OF NUJOMA. IF IT WAS ANY CONSOLATION, NYERERE CONTINUED, THE FRONT LINE STATES HAD HAD A DIFFICULT TIME TRACKING DOWN ALL OF THE NATIONALISTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THERE WERE TIMES WHEN THEY CONVENED A CONFERENCE AND WERE NOT SURE THAT ANY OF THE NATIONALISTS WOULD BE PRESENT. NYERERE LATER RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF LOCATING THE ELUSIVE NUJOMA AND SUGGESTED THAT THE MAPUTO CONFERENCE MIGHT BE THE BEST PLACE TO MEET WITH NUJOMA. WHEN MCHENRY SUGGESTED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO BE IN VIENNA FOR THE MEETING BETWEEN PM VORSTER AND VP MONDALE, NYERERE SUGGESTED THAT THE VIENNA MEETING WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN MEETING WITH NUJOMA AT THIS STAGE.

7. AT THE CONCLUSION, NYERERE SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENTATION, HE BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS ON THE NAMIBIA QUESTION BUT MUCH REMAINED TO BE DONE. HE HOPED THE FIVE WOULD PURSUE THEIR EFFORTS AND SUGGESTED THAT SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT BE MOVED BECAUSE IT HAD NEVER BEEN PRESSED BY THE FIVE BEFORE NOW. HE WENT ON TO STATE AT GREAT LENGTH THAT OF THE THREE QUESTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, NAMIBIA AND

HODESIA WERE THE EASIEST. SOUTH AFRICA WAS THE MOST  
DIFFICULT FOR SOUTH AFRICA WAS PREPARED TO FIGHT.

8. ALMOST AS A SECOND CONCLUSION, NYERERE ASKED THE FRENCH  
REPRESENTATIVE IF FRANCE WAS COMMITTED TO THE WORK OF THE  
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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 106242

FIVE ON NAMIBIA. AMB THABAULT REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, AT  
WHICH POINT PRESIDENT NYERERE SUGGESTED THAT FRANCE SHOULD  
STOP SUPPLYING ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA. "FRANCE DOES NOT NEED  
THE MONEY," NYERERE SAID.

9. LATER SAME DAY FONMIN MKAPA CALLED MCHENRY BACK TO SEE THE  
PRESIDENT. WITH JUST THE THREE PRESENT, PRESIDENT NYERERE SAID  
HE'D NOW HAD FURTHER TIME TO CONSIDER OUR EARLIER DIFFERENCES  
AND WOULD LIKE TO UNDERLINE ONE OR TWO POINTS, WHICH MAY NOT HAVE  
BEEN AS CLEAR AS HE WOULD HAVE WISHED.

10. NYERERE SAID IF VORSTER IS QTE REALLY CLEAR, AND WE CAN  
AGREE, ON OBJECTIVES UNQTE, THEN IF HE WANTS OUR HELP TO "DELIVER  
THE GOODS -- WE'LL DO SO." HE SUGGESTED THAT IN VORSTER'S HARD  
APPROACH THERE IS AN ATTEMPT TO FRIGHTEN THE WEST OFF IN REGARD TO  
SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF. THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM FACING ALL OF US IS  
THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, THE SO-CALLED CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE  
AUTHORITY; IF VORSTER WANTS ALL OF US TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR HIM --  
THEN TANZANIA WANTS TO BE SURE OF SUPERVISION AND CONTROL BY UN.

11. NYERERE THEN DREW A PARALLEL WITH ZIMBABWE WHERE WHAT WE  
(PRESUMABLY THE FRONT LINE STATES AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT) ARE  
LOOKING FOR IS AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING A CONSTITUTIONAL  
CONFERENCE DOMINATED BY THE NATIONALISTS. WHAT WE (PRESUMABLY  
THE FRONT LINE STATES, SWAPO AND OTHERS) ARE LOOKING FOR  
IN NAMIBIA IS THE SAME PROCESS WITH AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT  
DOMINATED BY SWAPO. QTE IF WE CAN'T HAVE THAT, AND VORSTER WILL  
HAVE TO SHOW US WHY NOT, THEN I WOULD BE HAPPY WITH AN INTERIM  
ARRANGEMENT (OR GOVERNMENT) DOMINATED BY AN UN UNQTE: ULTI-  
MATELY THIS WOULD BE RATIFIED BY SOME TYPE OF CONFERENCE. IN THIS  
EXERCISE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GET THE RELEVANT UN  
INSTITUTIONS (E.E., THE COUNCIL, ETC.) INVOLVED IN ACCEPTING  
THIS AUTHORITY.

12. HE INDICATED THAT IF THIS SCENARIO COULD BE ANTICIPATED --  
THE 5 LOOKING AFTER VORSTER -- QTE I'LL LOOK AFTER NUJOMA  
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 06 STATE 106242

UNQTE. IN DISCUSSING HIS POSITION, HE RECOGNIZED THAT HE WAS

ASKING FOR A CAMOUFLAGED RESOLUTION BUT AS BUT HE FELT THAT THIS  
RECENT INITIATIVE BY THE 5 WAS A POSITIVE STEP AND HE WISHED  
TO ENCOURAGE IT; HE FELT EQUALLY POSITIVE ABOUT THE UPCOMING  
MEETING BETWEEN VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE AND PRIME MINISTER  
VORSTER. LEVIN UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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## Message Attributes

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